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October 19, 2010

Terminated individual must repay salary received while his appeal was pending arbitration

Terminated individual must repay salary received while his appeal was pending arbitration
Rensselaer County v Hudson Valley Community College Faculty Association, Appellate Division, Third Dept., 262 AD2d 843, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 4 NY2d 753

In the Hudson Valley case, the Appellate Division decided that an arbitrator had the power to require a faculty member to repay the college for the salary it had paid to him while an appeal of his dismissal was pending arbitration.

The arbitrator had ordered the college to provide salary during this period, but apparently reserved the right to direct that the salary be repaid if she later determined that the dismissal was warranted, which she did.

Hudson Valley Community College dismissed a tenured member of its faculty, Thomas P. Neuhaus, and removed him from the payroll effective September 1, 1996.

The college alleged that Neuhaus had violated the collective bargaining agreement between the college and the Hudson Valley Community College Faculty Association when he gave each of the students in his electronics communication course a grade of 100 percent in lieu of an examination, which had been scheduled but was not administered.

Neuhaus was also charged with “improperly selling electronics equipment to students in exchange for special considerations.”

The Faculty Association filed two grievances on Neuhaus’ behalf. The first challenged Neuhaus’ termination. The second grievance concerned the college’s removing Neuhaus from the payroll and failing to continue his benefits while the disciplinary grievance was pending.

As to the salary grievance, the arbitrator ruled that the college had violated the collective bargaining agreement by failing to keep Neuhaus on the payroll during the pendency of the termination grievance. Accordingly, the college restored Neuhaus to the payroll retroactive to September 1, 1996.

The termination grievance then went to arbitration. In August 1997, the arbitrator rendered her award, concluding that:

1. Neuhaus was guilty of violating several articles in the collective bargaining agreement;

2. The penalty of termination was appropriate;

3. Neuhaus was not entitled to salary beyond August 21, 1996; and

4. Neuhaus should reimburse the college for salary paid to him after that date.

The college asked a State Supreme Court judge to confirm the arbitration award [see Section 7510, Civil Practice Law and Rules]. Neuhaus cross-petitioned the court seeking (1) to vacate the termination award and (2) to confirm the award in the salary grievance.

The Appellate Division rejected Neuhaus’ appeal seeking to overturn his termination. The court then said that it was “unpersuaded” that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in ordering Neuhaus to repay salary received for the period following August 21, 1996.

The Appellate Division ruled that the provision in the termination grievance award requiring Neuhaus to repay the salary the college had paid to him since September 1, 1996 “did not contradict” the salary grievance award. The court concluded that the salary grievance dealt exclusively with the issue of Neuhaus’ right to receive his salary pending the resolution of the termination grievance.

The court commented that in the salary grievance the arbitrator had ordered the college “to continue such payments until the matter is resolved by the issuance of an arbitration decision dealing with the merits of the dismissal, which decision shall then be controlling”. Accordingly, there was nothing to bar the arbitrator from directing Neuhaus to repay the salary he had received from the college since September 1, 1996.

However, there may be limitations with respect to the period during which a person against whom disciplinary charges have been filed may be suspended from his or her position without pay. An example of this is the statutory limitation set out in Section 75 of the Civil Service Law. Section 75 allows an individual against whom disciplinary charges have been filed to be suspended without pay for up to 30 days. The employee must be restored to the payroll after 30 days, even if he or she is directed not to report to work while the disciplinary action is pending.

In some cases a contract provision may allow the employer to suspend an individual without pay pending the determination of the disciplinary action. Such a provision is usually subjected to “narrow interpretation” by the courts. An illustration of such a narrow construction is set out in Board of Education v Nyquist (48 NY2D 97). In this case the Court of Appeals noted that the Taylor Law agreement negotiated by the parties allowed a teacher to be suspended without pay “pending an investigation and recommendation by the superintendent of schools.”

The board filed disciplinary charges against a suspended teacher after it had received the Superintendent’s recommendation. The teacher’s “suspended without pay” status was continued by the board. Some 10 months later a hearing panel found the teacher guilty of the charges. The penalty imposed: termination.

As a result of the litigation that followed, the district was directed to pay the teacher back salary for the period from the date of the superintendent’s recommendation to the board until the effective date of the dismissal. The Court of Appeals reasoned that “there (was) no authorization [in the contract] for the board’s suspending the employee without pay after the superintendent completed his investigation and made his report”.

Had the contract permitted the board to continue the teacher’s suspension without pay pending a final disciplinary decision, it appears likely that such a suspension would have been upheld by the court. The only limitation on the duration of a suspension without pay when authorized by a Taylor Law agreement appears to be that the employer may not use the suspension without pay as a sword by delaying the proceedings.

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If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary procedures involving public officers and employees, please click here: http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/

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